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Abstract
The digital age is characterized by hyperconnected services. Whenever we engage with an app
we likely engage with a broader set of actors, often
facilitated by a platform. Essentially, we engage with
a service ecosystem posing particular challenges for
privacy regulation. With GDPR taking effect we seek
to understand the implications of it for privacy in
such ecosystems. Interconnected services can
facilitate the diffusion of personal data and thus
impede with individual privacy rights. We apply a
novel techno-legal analysis to the flow of personal
information in service ecosystems. Based on two
cases, we show that novel requirements arise for
platforms as key actors in service ecosystems. Using
our techno-legal analysis we conclude that two major
platform providers, Apple and Facebook, have more
in common from a legal perspective than the current
rhetoric suggests. Based on the analysis, we discuss
where privacy-preserving solutions in service
ecosystems need to be positioned.

1. Introduction
Recently, numerous cases have been reported in
which Facebook had a big impact on the diffusion of
personal data. These are linked by the fact that
Facebook has illegitimately shared data of users in
data partnerships to different companies, at least to
60 device manufacturers [1]. Moreover, Facebook
shared information with apps, although this was
technically revised before and should prevent such
privacy-critical transmission [2]. The most
controversial case that became public can be referred
to as the case of Cambridge Analytica’s misuse of
Facebook user data. About 87 million Facebook users
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were affected by the privacy-invasive access of data
[3]. Afterwards, this data was delivered to Cambridge
Analytica which, based on personality analyses,
placed targeted election advertisement on Facebook.
Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, criticized Facebook
how user data is handled on that platform. He stated
that the “[…] situation is so dire and has become so
large that probably some well-crafted regulation is
necessary” [4]. Furthermore, he also stated in the
context of the Cambridge Analytica case that he
“[…] wouldn’t be in this situation” [4].
In this article we examine two published privacycritical cases with two different platforms. The first
case, with ‘This Is Your Digital Life’ (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Digital Life’) and Cambridge
Analytica, where Facebook acts as platform, and the
case with AccuWeather and RevealMobile, where
iOS acts as platform by the provider Apple. The
cases represent today’s interconnected service
ecosystems in which personal data is diffused. In our
analysis, we examine the technical aspects and we
build on the GDPR for a legal perspective. We
specify the responsibilities, contributing to a
realization of the GDPR in practice and the design of
privacy-aware service ecosystems [5]. Consequently,
research may benefit from a further discussion about
the scope of actor obligations in service ecosystems
and where to position responsibility.
The article begins with a theoretical framework
that includes the foundations of information privacy
in service ecosystems. Afterwards, we describe the
roles defined in the GDPR. Subsequently, we carry
out a techno-legal analysis of the two cases. Based on
this, we position the accountability and derive legal
obligations according to the GDPR. From this, we
outline possible solution positions in service
ecosystems and draw a conclusion.
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2. Theoretical framework
2.1 Information privacy in service ecosystems
In this article, we focus on the diffusion of
personal data respectively personal information in
hyper-connected services. In general, the ways in
which services are delivered have changed essentially
in many respects [6]. Service delivery has likewise
shifted from single services towards ecosystems of
services [6, 7] (Figure 1). We posit these service
ecosystems comprise users, platforms, frontend
services, and backend services.
Service Ecosystem

User

Platform

Frontend
Service

Backend
Service

management, additional features like ‘Login with
Facebook’ but also to increase income streams
through implementing advertisement companies.
The actors in the service ecosystems can appear
not just once but several times; for instance, a
frontend service integrates various backend services
[20]. The interactions of the actors result in the
diffusion of personal data in hyper-connected
services ecosystems [20]. In this context, the term
“service ecosystems” is used to indicate that the
included actors interact not only with well-designed
information systems. At some points, actors make
decisions that have consequences for other actors on
subsequent (design) decisions. In total, the multiactor information-processing in service ecosystems
have consequences for information privacy of users.
That poses particular challenges [21], where it
remains to be seen to what extent the GDPR in form
of data regulation can cover these challenges.

Figure 1. Adapted model of information
privacy in service ecosystems [8]

2.2 GDPR

Users are the individuals with his/her personal
information interacting on the platform. Information
privacy of users can be related to an individual’s
ability to personally control information about
oneself [9, 10]. In this context, privacy risks and
privacy concerns exist in the decision-making of
users whether to share data [11, 12]. However,
decision-making implies both choice and consent,
while in reality users have incomplete and
asymmetric information about actors accessing their
personal data, which results in an inability to act in a
self-interested manner [13].
Platforms facilitate multi-sided interactions of
different actors [14, 15], typically between users and
frontend services [16]. In this article, we define
platforms as a set of digital resources that enable
value-creating interactions between frontend services
and users [15]. Examples for platforms are Facebook,
iOS and Android, which are not limited to the set of
digital, technical resources and include also the
governance of this set. In this context, Apple
represents the platform provider of the platform iOS
which includes digital resources like the operating
systems and the AppStore. Platform providers define
the governance rules that attempt to balance platform
usage [17]. Here, platforms act as intermediaries and
can exert control over how data and service flows
between platform participants [17, 18]. Examples for
this are Apple’s rules for developers [19].
Frontend services access and interact on these
platforms and offer their services to users in form of
e. g. applications. Backend services are implemented
by frontend services for application performance

In May 2018 the GDPR [22], drafted already in
2016 after long discussion in the so called trialogue
(between
European
Commission,
European
Parliament and the Council), was implemented after a
two-year transitional phase. Its aim is to protect EU
citizens' privacy in the digital world in the form of
data protection and data regulation [23]. One of its
important changes in comparison to the Data
Protection Directive it replaced is an expanded scope
of applicability, binding even companies outside of
the EU when they process EU citizens' data.
On the most fundamental level data protection
offers a binary system of two opposed actors: a
controller and a data subject. A person processing
personal data and the person to whom this data is
relating. However, just as the service ecosystems
offer a more complex reality of actors, the GDPR
does not limit itself to this traditional scenario and
offers more possible roles. In the following paragraph
we give a short introduction to those roles and the
responsibilities they bring with them.
According to the GDPR [22, Art. 4 No. 7]1, a
Controller is any (natural or legal) person that, alone
or jointly, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data. It is a role that is always
determined in relation to a specific act or set of acts
of processing [22, Art. 4 No. 2]. These can include
the collection, recording, organization, structuring,
storage, adaptation, usage, disclosure, cf. In order to
limit risks from acts of processing, the GDPR enjoins
controllers with certain obligations that are meant to
1

All further articles without designation are those of the GDPR.
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safeguard data subjects' rights. Most prominently,
Art. 6 declares that every act of processing is in need
of a legal basis, making it the controller’s duty to
make sure that and declare which one of the legal
grounds listed in the provision applies.
Furthermore, certain organizational and technical
measures need to be taken in order to ensure that the
controller is also in compliance with all the GDPR’s
specific data protection and data security provisions
and is able to prove said compliance at any time, as
Art. 24 declares. This concretizes Art. 5 (2) which, in
even more general terms, lays down the principle of
accountability as one of the cornerstones of lawful
processing. What makes the determination of the
scope of these obligations difficult is the rather
abstract way in which they are defined.
The measures that a controller has to take are
dependent on the scope, context and purpose of the
processing and on the severity and the probability of
occurrence of the risks for data subjects' rights and
need to be “suitable” and “appropriate”. In summary,
there is no general way of defining measures that
every controller can take without taking into account
the context and specifics. The specific provisions
whose compliance these measures are safeguarding
are numerous. They include data subjects' rights like
the processors' obligation to information, Art. 13, 14,
or the right to be forgotten, Art. 17.
According to Art. 4 No. 8, a Processor is any
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
other body that processes data on behalf of the
controller. While exercising physical control over the
processing act itself, a processor has no own agency
and only acts upon the controller instructions [24].
Referring back to the definition in Art. 4 No. 7, this
means that the determination of purposes and means
of processing have to remain with the controller.
While Art. 28 (3) additionally states that controller
and processor have to formally bestow this role on
the latter through a contract that contains the details
of their cooperation, the classification is independent
from such formal designations and primarily follows
factual elements [25, p. 8]. This provision follows the
technical reality of the outsourcing of know-how and
certain steps of action. Consequently, the GDPR
privileges such cooperation in two ways: the
transmission of data from a controller to a processor
and the subsequent handling through the processor do
not fall under Art. 6 and thus are still covered by the
original legal ground declared by the controller;
processors do not need to meet the same obligations
that controllers do. Instead, the GDPR deems it
sufficient to put onto the controller the duty of
responsible selection, Art. 28 (1), and oblige

processors to keep records of their processing and
ensure basic safeguards of data security, Art. 30, 32.
According to Art. 26, two or more actors can be
Joint Controllers for an act of processing where they
jointly determine its purposes and means.
Consequently, the GDPR’s controller obligations
affect all joint controllers, although not necessarily
equally, as the ECJ notes: “operators […] may be
involved at different stages of that processing of
personal data and to different degrees, so that the
level of responsibility of each of them must be
assessed with regard to all the relevant circumstances
of the particular case” [26]. On the other hand, data
subjects can direct their claims on and execute their
subject rights against whichever controller they like
or can reach more easily, according to Art. 26 (3).

3. Case studies
In the following, we analyze two cases to identify
the reasons for the diffusion of personal data in
service ecosystems. In this context, there has already
been a call that “[…] researchers could explore
current privacy violations and their consequences and
factors that lead to organizational practices regarding
information privacy” [27, p. 576]. We selected cases
which have been published in news. This shows that
a virulence is present and has been brought to public
attention. We want to prove where critical aspects,
blind spots or violations of expectations exist.
To this end, we examine the cases at actor level,
from both a technical and legal point of view.
Technically, we examine systems settings, interfaces
and data flows. This is the basis for the legal analysis.
We classify the actors according to the GDPR, which
had not yet come into force at the time of the cases.
However, the analysis aims at preventing such cases
nowadays. The actor obligations following from it
pose the most interesting question. Here, the tracks
are being laid down for two further questions: which
of the actors were responsible in what way and did
they meet their responsibilities?

3.1 “Facebook, ‘Digital Life’ and Cambridge
Analytica”
The case of Cambridge Analytica and Facebook
has been widely covered in the media, also due to the
hearing of Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg before
the United States House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and Commerce [28]. In this
case, users used the frontend service application
‘Digital Life’ on the platform Facebook. By granting
the requested rights to this app, users disclosed to it
their own data as well as the opportunity to access the
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data of their friends on Facebook. While only
270,000 users directly used the quiz app, the data of
in total 87 million Facebook users was unveiled to
the app [3]. At the time that the case was formed,
users had to manually opt-out of sharing their data
with the apps used by friends [29]. Where users did
not do that, Facebook enabled apps to access their
data. After that, ‘Digital Life’ did not comply with
the platform policy to share such data. The developer
of the app shared data to the backend service
Cambridge Analytica, which used it to target users on
Facebook to deliver individualized advertising [30].
Technically, Facebook stores user data on servers
around the world. Other services acting on the
platform can access user data by the Graph API of
Facebook. During the time of the case, the API
version 1.0 was implemented. Services in form of
apps could request a huge range of user and user’s
friends' data [31] caused by the extended data access
permissions of the API. The 1.0 version was
launched in April 2010 and was available in the form
up to April 2015 [32]. After that, the Graph API v2.0
was introduced. With this API, requests of frontend
services on user friends' data, which previously
depicted the critical data flow in the case, returned no
data to the services [33]. At this point, Facebook had
restricted the outgoing data to frontend services.
From a legal point of view, data of affected users
were initially on the servers of Facebook. By
allowing apps access via Graph API, Facebook
opened up the possibility for apps to request data.
Thus, concerning the transmission of data from
Facebook to an app like ‘Digital Life’, Facebook at
least determined the means of processing by offering
the necessary technical infrastructure including
possible limitations. Considering that the existence of
apps on the Facebook platform – and in extension the
usage of user data by these apps – is part of
Facebooks business model, it does not seem
farfetched to classify them as a controller pertaining
to this act of processing. Whether or not ‘Digital
Life’ is a separate controller next to them or whether
they are joint controllers can be left aside at this
point. Consequently, Facebook would be fully
responsible for adhering to the GDPR’s provisions in
regard to these transmissions.
‘Digital Life’ directly collected two kinds of data:
profile data of users that installed and used the app,
their friends' profile data that represent the critical
data in this case as well as data when a user
interacted with the app. Profile data was already
stored on Facebook’s servers while the second
category of data were created through the usage of
the app (and presumably saved by Facebook). In both
cases the frontend service was completely

responsible for determining the purpose of data
requests. Since this was known to and approved by
Facebook a classification as joint controllers should
be made, at least for the first part of processing
(sharing of data from Facebook to ‘Digital Life’).
Cambridge Analytica bought the collected data
from ‘Digital Life’ to provide target advertisements
for elections and other purposes on behalf of their
own clients. Through this collection they obtained
control over data and started acting as an
(independent) controller in their own right.

3.2 “iOS, AccuWeather and RevealMobile”
In the second case, the platform iOS transmitted
via the application AccuWeather user device data
which were used to approximate users’ location by
the backend service called RevealMobile. This seems
to be in contrast to the permissions revoked by the
user in iOS to access her/his location. The privacy
statement of the frontend service AccuWeather
declared that the application and implemented
backend services can use methods to approximate
users’ locations [34]. Backend services were not
named in detail. However, RevealMobile states that
the technology the company uses “[…] sits inside
hundreds of apps […]” and “[i]t turns the location
data coming out of those apps into meaningful
audience data […]” [35, p. 2]. More precisely,
RevealMobile focusses on mobile marketing by using
such data to segment user groups for advertising [36].
Technically, the backend service RevealMobile
gained access to data of the iOS platform of a user
when s/he installed the application of AccuWeather,
which was after a review of Apple available in the
AppStore. In this application the RevealMobile SDK
is implemented. The user specifies when starting the
application for the first time whether or not the
application can access the location via the location
services of iOS. These location services are explained
in the iOS settings in the following way: “Location
Services uses GPS, Bluetooth, and crowd-sources
Wi-Fi hotspot and cell tower locations to determine
your approximate location (…)”. Users rejected to
share this location services data. Despite this, the
backend service on iOS took a detour to approximate
users’ location. In this case, the Wi-Fi router name,
BSSID (Basic Service Set Identification which
corresponds to the MAC address of the currently
connected wireless access point) as well as the
Bluetooth status was transmitted from the iOS
platform to the application [37]. During a testing
period of 36 hours, the data was sent 16 times to the
company RevealMobile [37]. Using this data, the
company was then able to determine the location of
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the user by enriching it with public databases about
stored locations of wireless access points [38, 39]. On
Apple’s website (which corresponds to the iOS
version of the case) [40] about location services in
iOS, however, this is presented differently to the user.
Thus, it is stated “Tap Don’t Allow to prevent
access” [40, 41]. A user can derive from this, that if
s/he deactivates access to location services to
applications, this is technically implemented in such
a way that iOS does not return any location data or
data for location approximation to applications. It is
important to stress, however, that on a technical level,
Apple’s statement still holds: RevealMobile did not
gain direct data through Apple’s location services,
instead bypassing this access channel.
The legal classification in this case is more
complex than in the first case. Since affected data
was directly transmitted from the phone’s operating
system to RevealMobile in the moment it was
accrued, no active act of processing by iOS had
happened before. Data was only stored on the user’s
phone, not on Apple servers. Nevertheless, the
platform iOS provided the technical infrastructure
and the legal agreement that determined how and in
which scenarios apps can access certain types of data.
In addition, the way the existence of apps is part of
iOS’s appeal to users and therefore heavily important
for Apple, can be compared to the way Facebook
offers apps access to users' data. A classification of
the platform provider Apple as processor, if not
controller, should therefore not be ruled out.
One important difference to the first case
concerns the type of data and data transfer in the
context of users' actions. While on Facebook the
overwhelming part of affected data had been shared
and therefore transmitted to Facebook – although not
to ‘Digital Life’ when the users' friends are in
question – consciously and voluntarily, this was not
the case with iOS. On the contrary, users explicitly
declined the transmission of what Apple labeled
“location data” to AccuWeather, thereby implicitly
voicing their rejection of the transmission of any data
that might be used to determine the user’s location.
Of course, one might argue that the accruement of
WiFi and Bluetooth data is a technical necessity and
therefore covered by the users' general intention of
using the phone with all its features. Still, this data
would not be necessary for a functioning weather
application – making the user ask for a specific city’s
or area’s weather is less comfortable for him but
might still be what he wants.
On the one hand, the platform’s involvement is
smaller here than in the first case since Apple does
not initially determine the precise purpose of the
subsequent processing. On the other hand, it is the

deliberate design of the platform that allows apps to
directly access particular data. The way Apple
actively changes this design to accommodate
disclosed cases of misuse can be seen in the way the
access to iOS devices’ MAC addresses was
deprecated in iOS 7 [42], the access to MAC
addresses of network devices (such as WiFi routers)
barred in iOS 11 [43]. Apple is thereby at least
contributing to the determination of the means
through which this data is processed. It is also, at
least partly, determining the general purpose on an
upstream level by opening up the possibility for
approved apps to access this data in the first place
and giving app developers specific terms of use to
sign, thereby specifying which purposes are allowed
and which are not. Apps that violate the Apple
License Agreement or are in conflict with some of
the App Review Guidelines get rejected and don’t
make it into the AppStore. This is also what
distinguishes a controlled platform like iOS from an
open one like Windows, where a user can freely
install programs that weren’t vetted and officially
included in an AppStore equivalent. While this level
of involvement still does not mirror the one typically
associated with data controllers determining all
purposes and means of processing, it does not mean
that a classification as controller is impossible. As
Art. 29 states: even when at the micro-level the
actions of different actors “appear as disconnected, as
each of them may have a different purpose”, they can
still on the macro-level be “pursuing a joint purpose
or using jointly defined means” [25, p. 20].
This interpretation of the GDPR’s roles in iOS’s
case is also in line with the significance the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) attributes to the classification
of actors as controllers and processors for the
effective protection of the affected users' rights and
freedoms [26]. This means that one criterion for
deciding between possible classifications is the way
the respective roles allow for a better or worse
protection of the users' rights. The judgement is based
on the now obsolete EU Data Protection Directive
but its results, at least concerning this aspect, can be
applied to the GDPR as well. This also applies to the
ECJ’s notion that where several operators are jointly
responsible, it is not required that each of those
necessarily have access to the personal data
concerned [26]. Referring back that data is accrued
from the users' phone without their awareness and
that iOS provides the technical infrastructure that
constitutes the means for the processing and
consequently has the possibility of somewhat
influencing possibilities and limitations of access, it
therefore to us seems commanded to classify them as
a controller in relation to these acts of processing.
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For the classification of the frontend service the
course of data is not as trivial as in the other case. In
this case AccuWeather never got its hands on the
data. Instead, RevealMobile had direct access to the
data of the platform and accrued them in a straight
line from there without a data flow through
AccuWeather servers. The way that RevealMobile
was able to do that was due to their SDK being
implemented in the code of the AccuWeather app,
thus an active decision of the app’s organization. This
raises the question if a classification as either
controller or processor is possible even when the
actor in question didn’t consciously know how much
access to certain kinds of data it allowed another
actor. Such classification could be constructed as a
kind of accountability through negligence, triggered
by implementing an SDK without exact knowledge
of what the code is able to request. The attribution of
responsibility connected to this role follows the
affected actor’s control over the processing act in
question. Here, AccuWeather once made the
conscious decision of implementing RevealMobile’s
SDK for clearly specified purposes. Without this
decision RevealMobile wouldn’t have had access to
users' data. AccuWeather was therefore heavily
involved in determining both purposes and means of
the processing and should be classified as (joint)
controller as well. The fact that they not have known
about data that was accrued does not change anything
about that but becomes relevant when checking for
compliance of the obligations connected to the role.
RevealMobile actively accrued data from the
users' phone for purposes they determined on their
own. They used infrastructure provided by iOS and
by AccuWeather, but for their own purpose and in
situations that were contractually (if not technically)
forbidden and therefore clearly acted as a controller.
In this context, a classification of Apple as joint
controller seems the most plausible.

4. Discussion
At this point we compare the two cases with
regard to their factual circumstances (Table 1) and
demonstrate differences and similarities by looking at
the actors, their motivations and the ways they had
the possibility to do things differently, including
reciprocal consequences and effects. Hereafter, we
examine to what extent the GDPR’s controller
obligations are able to reflect the differences.
Both platforms, Facebook and iOS, offer an
infrastructure that brings together users and different
kinds of services, while also offering their own
services. Through technical measures both can handle
their infrastructure to limit the ways external services

can access personal data. In both cases personal data
was disseminated and, in both cases, this could have
been prevented technically but was not.
One major difference concerns the way that user
knowledge and actions were reflected in the
processing. In the first case, friends of those users
that actively used the ‘Digital Life’ application did
not explicitly deny Facebook this usage of their data.
However, the option of sharing their data, with their
friends' apps was hidden under multiple layers of
settings and by default turned on, meaning a user had
to actively “opt out” of this usage [29]. This affected
data was actively shared by users to Facebook. In the
second case, users were specifically asked whether
they want to share their location with the app.
However, even when sharing was rejected, data was
transmitted directly from iOS via the AccuWeather
app to the backend service RevealMobile with which
the location was approximated. This might seem like
the bigger breach since the users' explicit rejection
was violated. However, implying the users' consent
by forcing them to opt out of the sharing and hiding
the respective option under multiple layers of settings
instead of asking them when a decision becomes
relevant effectively keeps the majority of users from
ever consciously making that decision. In the first
case, Facebook had been the subject of public
criticism. In the other case, the focus was usually on
AccuWeather and RevealMobile. However, the
analysis in this article reveals that Apple as a
platform provider can be made responsible due to its
crucial role regarding the diffusion of personal
information. At least since the GDPR is in effect.
As described above, we propose a classification
of the platforms as joint controllers in both examined
cases in order to reflect their prominent role in the
diffusion of users' data throughout the respective
ecosystems. Following this classification certain
obligations are inflicted by the GDPR. We will
introduce these obligations below. In this context,
another question arises: how should these obligations
be distributed amongst the controllers and how can
they be adhered by them? While the question of
distribution can to some extent be decided by the
controllers through contractual arrangements, the
external distribution in relation to the affected data
subject has to always mirror the impact on his/her
rights. This means that, while a data subject can
demand the fulfillment of obligations from each
controller individually, it makes sense to encourage
each controller to fulfill those obligations that are
connected to its area and scope of involvement in the
processing, since this ensures the highest probability
of overall compliance and therefore safeguards the
data subjects' rights in the most efficient way.
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Table 1. Overview of the techno-legal analysis with the focus on the two platforms

Techno

Classes

“iOS, AccuWeather and RevealMobile”
Data was stored on user’s phone, not on Apple
servers
RevealMobile used iOS functions to access WiFi
data
Transmission from iOS via integrated SDK of
RevealMobile in the AccuWeather app
Name, BSSID of Wi-Fi connection, Bluetooth
status

Data Storage

Facebook stored user data on servers

Interface

Purpose of
Processing

‘Digital Life’ accessed user data on the
platform via the Graph API
Subsequent data transmission of ‘Digital
Life’ to Cambridge Analytica
App users' profile data, app usage data, app
user’s friends' profile data
270,000 app users' profile and usage data,
87 million app user’s friends' profile data
Default setting of sharing data with the
apps used by friends'
Overwhelming part of the affected data
was shared by users to the platform
Facebook offered the technical
infrastructure including possible limitations
‘Digital Life’ was completely responsible
for the purpose of data processing

Means of
Processing

Facebook determined it by the design of
the platform that allows apps to access data

Appeal

Existence of apps on Facebook– the usage
of user data by these apps – is part of
Facebook’s business model

Existence of apps is part of iOS’s appeal to users

Platform
Classification

Joint Controller

Joint Controller

Third Party
Data Access
Data Type
Data Amount
User Consent
User’s Role in
Data Sharing
Infrastructure

Legal

“Facebook, ‘Digital Life’ and
Cambridge Analytica”

4.1 “Facebook, ‘Digital Life’ and Cambridge
Analytica”
Here, the platform Facebook offers the
infrastructure for the processing of the personal data
of its users and therefore determines the means. It
also sets the purpose for the initial collection of data
by encouraging users to add personal information to
their profiles and to interact with the platform and
other users. Consequently, they are obliged to present
a legal ground [22, Art. 6] and to inform their users
about the ways they plan to use this data [22, Art.
13]. Concerning the legal basis, Facebook lists
different kinds of potential bases on its website for
different intended usage cases [44]. Since users have
the possibility to opt out of the sharing of their data to
apps that their friends are using, the basis of consent
[22, Art. 6 No. 1] seems most likely. However, since
this option was automatically activated when signing
up for Facebook and had to manually be turned off,
the legal effectiveness of such consent seems very
doubtful. Amongst other criteria, consent must be
given freely and by an informed data subject. In
addition, Art. 7 No. 2 states that where a consent is

In 36 hours, data was transmitted 16 times
User's rejection of sharing location data
No settings options except to disable WiFi or
Bluetooth functions
iOS provided the technical infrastructure that
determined how and when apps can access data
AccuWeather determined the purpose, Apple
agreed by publishing the app in the AppStore
iOS determined it by providing the technical
infrastructure and had the possibility of
influencing the data access

given through a statement that includes other matters.
Where a user automatically and without explicitly
opting in consents to sharing his/her data through
friends using apps when s/he signs up to Facebook,
no such manner can be seen. Furthermore, the ideal
of data protection by default in Art. 25 (2) is not
respected. It is highly doubtful that Facebook had
legal grounds for sharing this data with apps.
The second problem concerns the lack of
information that users received when their data were
shared with ‘Digital Life’ and then with Cambridge
Analytica. Here, again, Art. 13 and 14 demand that
data subjects get informed who gains access to their
data and what is being done with it. On the one hand,
obligating each of the controllers to directly inform
affected users when they each gain access to data
seems like a logical proposal. On the other hand,
Facebook as a platform is still mediating the way this
data is transmitted and has the closest connection to
the affected users. They should, at least of the
transmission to ‘Digital Life’, directly inform users.
However, the information was delayed by years [45].
On the next level, the data transmission from
‘Digital Life’ to Cambridge Analytica happens
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outside of Facebook. It would thus be too harsh – and
make no sense with regard to the effective
safeguarding of user rights – to once again oblige
Facebook to inform users. ‘Your Digital Life’ is both
closest to the affected users and in the position to
fulfill the obligation most easily.
In conclusion, Facebook would be responsible for
providing suitable technical and organizational
measures that allow the gathering of legally effective
acts of user consent and the provision of information
at each point where date is passed on to the next
controller [22, Art. 24].

4.2 “iOS, AccuWeather and RevealMobile”
In this case, missing or ineffective acts of consent
were not the problem. Instead explicitly denied
consent - expressed by denying access to all location
data through the location services settings in iOS –
was ignored. Therefore, the legal focus in this case
must concern the question whose responsibility it had
been to ensure that the current data flows through the
app corresponded with the scope of what the users'
consent allowed. This again falls under the obligation
to “[i]mplement technical and organizational
measures to ensure […] that processing is performed
in accordance with [the GDPR]” [22, Art. 24]. This is
such a general obligation that forcing only one of the
three joint controllers to adhere to it would be wrong.
Since the norm is heavily context-depended and
therefore does not offer a “one size fits all” solution
to compliance with the obligation, the question is
which measures could have reasonably been
demanded from iOS in this case and could be
demanded in similar cases.
In conjunction with this question one might look
at the iOS settings for location services iOS already
offers its users. By anchoring these settings within
the phone’s operating system, iOS takes up a
mediating role between user and app. The user
expresses the part of his consent that concerns
location data in the broadest sense through iOS which
passes it on to the respective app. Therefore, it would
be consequential to obligate iOS to fill out this role
appropriately, by denying the flow of data to the app
for all data that might be used to approximate or
determine the location of the user, on a technical
level, as far as such a technical limitation of data flow
can be achieved by reasonable measures. In addition
to the case, other technical possibilities to determine
the location of users [46] must also be excluded. On
the other hand, such an unmitigated denial of all
potentially “damaging” data would certainly not be
feasible. Some data is fundamentally neutral and only
becomes sensitive by third parties (mis)using them in

contrast to the agreed purpose, a purpose for which it
might in turn be necessary to use. This conundrum is
beautifully shown in the example of iOS’s complete
ban of using network devices’ MAC addresses in iOS
11 [43].This ban, a result of apps’ misuse of this data,
made many network scanning apps inoperable as they
now couldn’t do what they were designed to do.
Still, insisting on measures on the part of iOS
seems to us inevitable. Even AccuWeather’s privacy
statement refers the user with regard to possible
solutions when it states that if users “[…] turn off
‘Location Services’ or a similar setting that controls
GPS functionality, the device still may automatically
send or receive this other information as long as you
[the user] have these other communications types
enabled. [The user] should read the instructions
related to [his/her] device, operating system or
browser to learn about how to control the information
[his/her] device may transmit” [47].
In conclusion, no specific recommendation of
technical and organizational measures that could
downright and without a doubt prevent any diffusion
of data that could potentially be used to infer the
location can be made. Neither can we, consequently,
say whether Apple violated its controller obligations
or not. While there are several reasons for negating
this question, the fact that access possibilities to
MAC addresses were restricted in iOS 7 and iOS 11
indicates that Apple reacted to the disclosure of this
problem. And even while there is no definitive
solution, the mere examination of Apple as a
potential controller and the subsequent discussions
about the scope of their obligations seems to us like a
fruitful starting point for discussion. Furthermore,
establishing rules regarding procedures and
transparency might be an advantage, where the
knowledge of when and through which motivation
Apple reacts lies with Apple alone.

4.3 Position privacy-preserving solutions
Building on the findings above, we posit that
several generalizations can be made. First, and
arguably not that surprising, platforms tend to be the
actors within the service ecosystems described in 2.1.
that have the most leverage when it comes to
introducing efficient solutions that improve the
preservation of information privacy within these
ecosystems. As the gatekeepers regulating who is a
part of an ecosystem and what is allowed there,
changes of rules affect all actors and can therefore
steer away from privacy-endangering trends.
Second, platform providers can be so heavily
involved in the process of selecting the players that
get allowed that it seems possible to classify them as
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controllers according to the GDPR and therefore
subject them to obligations that force them to find
good and effective solutions for privacy risks while
making those solutions and their formation process
transparent. While this paper discusses specific cases,
these findings could potentially be applied to other
similarly controlled platforms as well.
Third, it is apparent that imposing such
obligations on platform providers cannot be the
universal answer. Technical solutions possible today
are always limited, as Apple’s changes in disclosing
MAC addresses in iOS 11 and the ensuring critique
showed. Putting enhanced obligations on platforms
also increases their power over smaller actors,
thereby solidifying structures that might be
problematic on other levels and leading to
unexpected secondary effects.
Still, we envisage that with shining the light on
platform providers as potential controllers we can
start a public discourse about how far their
obligations can reach, how they can be met and how
they can be efficiently complemented by the
obligations imposed on frontend services. The
development of codes of conduct and certification
schemes according to Art. 40-43 could help with the
standardization.

5. Conclusion and outlook
Taking into account the results of this article,
platforms bear a great responsibility for the diffusion
of personal data in service ecosystems. With a view
to media, the case of Facebook, ‘Digital Life’ and
Cambridge Analytica has been widely covered. It
becomes clear that responsibility is seen on the side
of Facebook which is also made clear in this article.
The thrilling item in this story, however, is the role of
the sibling Apple within the scope of its platform
iOS. In accordance with the techno-legal analysis, we
came to the same classification as a joint controller.
In total, such platforms take up a big role in the
agency of the diffusion of personal data in today's
interconnected services. At first glance it is positive
for information privacy to read news such that Apple
restrict using network devices’ MAC addresses in
iOS 11 [43], that “Facebook suspends 200 apps as
part of investigation into data misuse” [48]. However,
these news also show the responsibility and scope of
actions of platforms. It is questionable that platform
rules and compliance with them are checked only
occasionally to be followed by actions – this should
be done comprehensively and continuously. To return
to the beginning of this article – from a legal
perspective Tim Cook finds himself with Apple in a

very similar situation as Facebook. We make the call
that responsibilities according the GDPR and
outlined obligations should be debated for all
platform siblings, in the whole GDPR family.
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